Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 32

Article 7

June 2011

An Express Reservation? An Analysis of Reservations under the
Equal Footing Doctrine as Applied in United States v. Milner
Patrick Beddow

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
32 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 203 (2011)

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

An Express Reservation? An Analysis of Reservations under the
Equal Footing Doctrine as Applied in United States v. Milner
Patrick Beddow*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Milner cements the idea and recognition
that the federal government may make reservations of land prior to
statehood, despite the equal footing doctrine. The Milner court first
addressed ownership of the tidelands with respect to the equal footing
doctrine 2 and subsequently directed its attention to a civil trespass
claim and alleged violations of both the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA) 3 and the Clean Water Act
(CWA).4 This comment will address the argument that the state of
Washington, and not the United States, holds title to the tidelands, as
that is a precursory issue to the trespass action. Milner is unique
because, unlike controlling cases, the status of title depends heavily
on an executive order never officially ratified by Congress.

*
Candidate for J.D. 2012, The University of Montana School of
Law. The author extends a special thanks to Pat and Lisa Beddow for their
support. The author additionally offers thanks to all members of the Public Land &
Resources Law Review for their advice and critique throughout the editing and
publication process.
1.
U.S. v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3273 (May 17, 2010).
2.
Id. at 1180. Tideland is defined as the land between the ordinary high
and low tide lines. Black's Law Dictionary 719 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 3d pocket
ed., West 2006). On the Pacific Coast, there are two tides daily, and accordingly,
two different means of measurement. The mean high-water (MHW) is an average
of a day's high tides, while the mean higher-high-water (MHHW) is the higher of
the two. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Homeowners did not raise an argument as to the extent of the tidelands under the
issue of ownership addressed in this case note. See Milner, 583 F.3d at 1183.
3.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
4.
Id. at § 1311.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Lummi people have traditionally resided along the
Pacific Coast in the area north of what is now Seattle, Washington.5
For centuries, the Lummi have been substantially dependent upon
fishing as a means of nutritional sustenance and economic viability. 6
In August of 1848, the Thirtieth Congress established the
Oregon Territory,7 which encompassed present-day Washington, and
was subject to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The Northwest
Ordinance provided, in part, that "good faith shall always be
observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be
taken from them without their consent . . . for [the purpose of]

preserving peace and friendship with them." 9 In 1850, Congress
authorized negotiations with tribes residing in the Oregon Territory
for the purpose of securing title to their lands.o In March of 1853,
the Washington Territory was formed by culling it from the northern
portion of the Oregon Territory, maintaining the laws in effect for the
Oregon Territory at that time. 1
In order to secure title to the land and comply with the
Northwest Ordinance, the Treaty of Point Elliotl 2 (Treaty) was

5.
Ann Stark, Lummi Nation Atlas: February2008, at 6,
http://www.lumminsn.gov/NR/GIS/PDF/LummiAtlas Feb2008.pdf
(last updated Feb., 2008).
6.
The Plan. Support Group of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, The Lummi
Reservation: History - Present-Potential 1 (U.S. Dept. of the Int. 1974)..
7.
An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, ch.
CLCXXVll, 9 Stat. 323 (1851).
8.
Id. at 329.
9.
An Act to Providefor the Government of the Territory Northwest of
the River Ohio, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1845) (enacted 1789).
10. Handbook of Western Washington Indian Treaties: With Special
Attention to Treaty Fishing Rights 23 (Daniel L. Boxberger ed., Lummi Indian
School of Aquaculture and Fisheries 1979) [hereinafter Treaties Handbook].
11.
Id. On March 2, 1853, Congress established the Washington
Territory, with a southern border of the middle of the main channel of the
Columbia River, a northern boundary at the forty sixth parallel, and west to the
Continental Divide. See An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of
Washington, ch. XC, 10 Stat. 172 (1855).
12. Treaty Between the United States and the Dwamish, Suqudmish, and
Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory (signed
Jan. 22, 1855) 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Treaty ofPoint Elliot].
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executed between the United States and Indian tribes, including the
Lummi, in western Washington Territory on January 22, 1855.13
First, the Treaty called for the Indians to surrender all lands west of
the Cascade Mountains in what is now the northwest portion of
Washington State, near present-day Bellingham.14 Article II set aside
land for the exclusive use of the tribes, including a peninsula that
now comprises the eastern portion of the Lummi Reservation
(Reservation).' 5 The Treaty expressly mandated that the Lummi
reside exclusively within the bounds of their Reservation and that no
white person be allowed to occupy its land without permission or
agreement.16 Article V retained the Lummi's right to use their
traditional fishing grounds in common with the citizens of the
territory.' 7 Furthermore, Article VII of the Treaty delegated to the
President of the United States the discretion and authority to move
the Reservation, alter its bounds or allow for the allotment of lands
within the Reservation.' 8
An executive order, issued by President Ulysses Grant in
1873, expanded the Reservation onto the mainland, to include Sandy
Point in present-day Whatcom County, Washington.19 As of the date

13.
14.

Id.
The Plan. Support Group of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, supra n. 6,

at 2.
15.
Treaty ofPoint Elliot, supra n. 12, at 928.
16.
Id
17. Id.
18.
Id at 929.
19.
Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties vol. 1, 917 (2d
ed., Govt. Printing Off.) (stating "[i]t is hereby ordered that the following tract of
country in Washington Territory be withdrawn from sale and set apart for the use
and occupation of the Dwamish and other allied tribes of Indians, viz:
Commencing at the eastern mouth of Lummi River; thence up said river to the
point where it is intersected by the line between sections 7 and 8 of township 38
north, range 8 east of the Willamette meridian; thence due north on said section
line to the township line between townships 38 and 39; thence west along said
township line to the low water mark on the shore of the Gulf of Georgia; thence
southerly and easterly along the said shore, with the meanders thereof, across the
western mouth of Lummi River, and around Point Francis; thence northeasterly to
the place of beginning; so much thereof as lies south of the west fork of the Lummi
River being a part of the island already set apart by the second article of the treaty
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of the order, the Reservation was extended "to the low water mark on
the shore of the Gulf of Georgia." 20 The tidelands within the defined
borders of the Reservation were withdrawn from sale and set aside
for the Lummi's exclusive use.2 1 This addressed a primary concern
of the Lummi, as they were heavily dependent on harvesting aquatic
species for subsistence.2 2
The Allotment Act of 1887, commonly known as the Dawes
Act, provided the land within the Reservation could be allotted to
tribal members on a pro rata basis. 23 Section 5 of the Dawes Act
required the United States to hold the land in trust for a period of
twenty five years, during which time it was to be maintained for use
solely by the native peoples. 24 Following the twenty-five year
period, an allottee could either retain the property or alienate the land
to a non-Indian. 25 Many, though not all, allottees opted for the
latter.26 According to President Grant's Executive Order, the
allotment applied only to the uplands, 27 while the tidelands were still
held in trust for the Lummi.28 The order did not, however, explicitly
prohibit leasing the tidelands. 29
In 1863, the Idaho Territory was established and, in its
inception, defined the boundaries of what is now Washington State.3 0
Anticipating Washington's application for statehood, Congress
passed the Enabling Act of 1889 outlining the requirements for
with the Dwamish and other allied tribes of Indians, made and concluded January
22, 1857." See infra Appendix B).
20. Id. The Gulf of Georgia is now known as the Strait of Georgia.
21.
Kappler, supra n. 19, at 917.
22.
Treaties Handbook, supra n. 10, at 25,
23.
An Act to Providefor the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians
on the Various Reservations, and to Extend the Protection of the Laws of the
United States and the Territories Over the Indians, and for Other Purposes, ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
24. Id at 389.
25. Id.
26.
The Plan. Support Group of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, supra n. 6,
at 2.
27.
Uplands indicate those lands above the MHW mark. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. I ofPend Oreille Co. v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d 666, 668 n. 1 (1967); see also
Utah v. U.S., 394 U.S. 89, 91 n. 1 (1969).
28. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181.
29. Kappler, supra n. 19, at 917.
30. An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of
Idaho, ch. CXVII, 12 Stat. 808 (1863).
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admission to the Union. 3 1 The Act specified that title to Indian
reservation land would not pass to the state upon admission but rather
would remain with the United States under Congress' control until
expressly surrendered.3 2 On November 11, 1889, having met the
requirements set forth in the Enabling Act, Washington was admitted
to the Union. 33
Presently, the Lummi Reservation is situated primarily on the
Lummi Peninsula, approximately ninety miles north of Seattle,
Washington, bordering Bellingham and Lummi Bays to the east and
west, respectively. 34 As of 2008, the Lummi claimed that the
Reservation consisted of approximately twenty-six square miles of
land and thirty-eight miles of shoreline, including Portage Island and
the floodplains and deltas of both the Red and Nooksack Rivers. 35
Of the uplands, 9,848 acres were designated as affiliated with the
Lummi Tribe or its members, while 3,000 acres were classified as
non-tribal fee. 36 The tidelands, totaling approximately 7,000 acres,
were noted as held in tribal trust. 37

31.
An Act to Providefor the Division of Dakota into Two States and to
Enable the People of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to
Form Constitutions and State Governments and to be Admitted into the Union on
an EqualFooting with the OriginalStates, and to Make Donations ofPublic Lands
to Such States, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
32.
Id. at 677. The Enabling Act stated citizens agreed to "disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limited owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States."
33.
President Benjamin Harrison proclaimed that Washington had met the
prescribed requirements set forth previously by Congress, and that ratification of
Washington's statehood was complete. By the President of the United States of
America: A Proclamation,26 Stat. 1552, 1553 (1891) (proclaimed 1889).
34.
Stark, supra n. 5, at 6. See infra Appendix A.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 52. The status of the land is broken down as follows in acres:
Individual Native Trust, 6,800; Tribal Trust, 1,575; In Process of Becoming Trust
Land, 990; Tribal Fee, 289; Individual Native Fee, 194; Non-Native Fee, 3,000.
See generally id.
37.
Id.
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Despite the shift away from their traditional seafood diet in
recent years, many tribal members still rely on the harvest of aquatic
species for subsistence and income.38 The right to exclude, arguably
paramount in a bundle of property rights, ensures exclusive tribal
access to the tidelands, which is essential to maintaining the Lummi's
connection to a culture rooted in fishing. 39
III. UNITED STATES v. AHLNER
A. Factualand ProceduralBackground
Due to the Allotment Act, title to a substantial portion of
uplands within the Lummi Reservation eventually came to be held by
non-Indians.40 In 1963, several successors in interest, through a
homeowners' organization, secured a lease on the tidelands from the
Lummi for the purpose of erecting "shore defense structures." 4 1
These structures were comprised of large boulders and other "rip rap"
to dissipate the tide and mitigate erosion.4 2 The structures were
erected during the homeowners' lease, which was effective from 1963
to 1988. Thereafter, the homeowners did not renew the lease either
individually or as an organization. 43 Since the lease's expiration, the
shore defense structures have remained in place. 44 However, over
time, erosion has caused the shoreline to fluctuate, and as a result,
many structures now sit below the high-water mark, within the
Lummi tidelands.4 5
In 1999 and 2001, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
and the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Washington, respectively, sent letters to the homeowners informing
38. Id. at 12.
39. See e.g. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 435 (1982).
40.
Ans. Br. of Appellee U.S. 10, 2007 WL 1511743 (9th Cir. Apr. 2,
2007).
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181.
41.
Appellants' Rev. Opening Br. 9, 2006 WL 4055746 (9th Cir. Dec. 29,
42.
2006).
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181.
43.
44. Id.
45. Id.; supra n. 2 (providing a definition of tideland and high-water
mark).
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them they neither possessed the requisite permits to maintain
structures and discharge fill material in the navigable waters of the
United States, nor did they possess the necessary permission from the
Lummi Nation to continue to maintain structures on the tidelands.4 6
The letters instructed the homeowners to either remove the structures
or secure leases on the tidelands.4 7 When the homeowners did
neither, the United States filed complaints alleging trespass, violation
of the RHA, and violation of the CWA.4 8 Thereafter, the Lummi
Nation intervened as a plaintiff to assert its ownership interest in the
tidelands .4

On partial summary judgment, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington held that: (1) the
tidelands were owned by the United States and not the State of
Washington; (2) the erosion of the homeowners' property was the
result of a gradual change; and (3) the tideland was ambulatory5 0 and
not arrested "so that it lay where the MHW [mean high-water mark]
line would be located but for the [h]omeowners' structures." 5 ' The
court then ruled on summary judgment that the homeowners were
liable for trespass to the tidelands and in violation of the RHA and
that one homeowner individually violated the CWA. 52 Accordingly,
the court ordered an injunction against the homeowners under the
RHA, calling for the removal of any structures located below the
MHW.13
On appeal, the homeowners made three separate arguments
regarding the trespass claim. However, only the threshold issuewhether title to the tidelands rests with Washington State pursuant to
the equal footing doctrine, thereby stripping the United States of

46.

Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181; see also Ans. Br. of Appellee U.S. at 7.

47. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181.
48.
Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1187. An ambulatory tideland is one where the boundary
between the uplands and tidelands changes with shifts in the body of water.
51.
Id. at 1181-1182.
52.
Id. at 1182.
53.
Id.; see supra n. 2 (discussion of mean high-water mark). On appeal,
the Homeowners challenged the summary judgment as to the trespass, RHA, and
CWA claims, as well as the injunction.

210

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCESLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 32

standing to assert a trespass claim-will be addressed in this
comment.
Principally, the homeowners asserted that, under the equal
footing doctrine,55 title to the tidelands passed to the state upon its
admission to the Union. 56 The homeowners' argument was largely
premised on a lack of congressional intent and the district court's use
of dated and allegedly improper precedent.5 7 The homeowners
argued Congress did not intend for the tidelands to become part of
the Reservation because it did not ratify the 1873 Executive Order.5 8
To further dispute congressional intent, the homeowners stated that
the federal government's policy at the time Washington joined the
Union was the destruction of tribal government through allotment. 59
The United States responded that the equal footing assertion was
barred by collateral estoppel since a prior action had quieted title to
the lands. 60 Even so, the United States contended there was no defect
to its title to the tidelands under the equal footing doctrine.61
B. Holding
The Ninth Circuit held that a presidential expansion of an
Indian reservation to include submerged lands precludes state
ownership under the equal footing doctrine, and therefore, the United
States, not the State of Washington, owns the tidelands. 62

54.

Appellants' Rev. Reply Br. 8, 2007 WL 2426727 (9th Cir. July 31,

2007).
55.
The equal footing doctrine was established to ensure that new states
entering the Union did so on an "equal footing" with states that had previously
been admitted by almost always conveying title to land under navigable waters to
the newly admitted state. Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001).
56. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1183.
57. Appellants' Rev. Opening Br. at 13-14 (Petitioners challenged the
district court's citation of U.S. v. Romaine, 255 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1919), and U.S. v.
Stotts, 49 F.2d 619 (1930)).
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 15-16. The issue of Lummi tidelands had been litigated in
district court, where title was found to rest with the United States. Stotts, 49 F.2d
at 620 (referencing Romaine). As for collateral estoppel, the court determined the
matter closed, but still sought to buttress this determination with a thorough
analysis. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1184.
Ans. Br. of Appellee U.S. at 16.
61.
62. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1186.
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The court recognized that whether the United States held title
to the tidelands depended on the effect of President Grant's
Executive Order under the equal footing doctrine.63 The equal
footing doctrine aimed to put newly admitted states on a level
playing field with their previously admitted counterparts by
transferring title to submerged lands to states upon admission to the
Union.64 The presumption of equal footing can be overcome by
showing that: (1) the lands were intentionally reserved by the United
States, and (2) that intent, in a way to prevent transfer, is recognized
by Congress.65 Passing this two-step, conjunctive test overcomes the
strong presumption that title to submerged lands passed to a state
upon admission. 66 The court said that "disposals by the United States
In
during the territorial period are not lightly to be inferred ."67
determining that the presumption of equal footing had been
overcome, the court cited United States v. Romaine,68 in which the
Ninth Circuit previously held the executive order alerted Congress of
the reservation, fulfilling the required congressional intent. 69
Despite the court's finding that the issue had previously been
addressed, it went through the analysis anyway. 70 The court found
that the Treaty of Point Elliot gave the President power to alter the
boundaries of the Reservation, and that his so doing fulfilled the
intent required by the first prong of the test.7 ' Congress' act of
admitting Washington into the Union fulfilled the second prong
because the executive order placed Congress on notice of the
reservation and Congress subsequently admitted Washington into the
72
Union, intentionally recognizing that reservation.
The court relied
on policy and precedent to bolster its conclusion, noting that
President Grant reserved the tidelands for the purpose of enhancing
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1183.
Idaho, 533 U.S. at 272-274.
Milner, 533 U.S. at 1183 (citing Idaho, 533 U.S. at 273).
Id. at 1185.
Id. (citing U.S. v. Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
Id. at 1184.
Romaine, 255 F. at 260.
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1184.
Id.
Id. at 1184-1187.
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the Lummi's fishing access.7 3 This reinforced an understanding long
held by the Lummi Tribe and others that "the United States owns the
tidelands and holds them in trust from the Lummi." 74 With this, the
court noted that treaties and other agreements with Indians are to be
liberally construed so that any ambiguities are resolved in favor of
the tribes.
IV. DISCUSSION OF CONTROLLING LAW
The equal footing doctrine arises from Congress' "power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property of the United States." 76 Although the
equal footing doctrine was born of nineteenth century precedent, a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions in the latter part of
the twentieth century, particularly Montana v. United States in 1981,
advanced the issue of title to submerged lands on Indian
reservations. 7 Furthermore, when considering treaties between the
United States and Indian tribes, deference is granted to the tribes
because of the unequal footing on which the treaties were made.7 8
A. The Equal FootingDoctrine

73.
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1184. In Stotts, the United States successfully
claimed ownership of the same tidelands by demonstrating that the Treaty of Point
Elliot and Grant's Executive Order, respectively, established the Lummi's
prerequisite need for the shoreline and the expansion of the Reservation to
encompass it. 49 F.2d at 620-621.
74. Milner, 583. F.3d at 1186.
75.
Id. at 1185 (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 318 U.S. 423, 431-432
(1943). The Court believed the statement here was broader than that in U.S. v.
Alaska. See 521 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1997). Milner, 583 F.3d at 1186. However, the
Court paralleled the setting aside of lands for an Indian reservation to lands
withdrawn for wildlife refuges in U.S. v. Alaska, 545 U.S. 75, 105 (2005). Milner,
583 F.3d at 1186.
76.
U.S. Const. art I, § 3, cl. 2 (see Pollardv. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224
(1845)).
77.
Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Through much of the twentieth
century, the principle case addressing ownership of submerged lands on Indian
reservations was Holt St. Bank. From 1970 until the decision in Montana, the
controlling case was Choctaw Nation v. Okla., 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
78.
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
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While the equal footing doctrine is meant to ensure the
passage of land beneath navigable waters to newly formed states,
precedent has carved out several tests and exceptions where the
federal government may retain title to those lands. In United States
v. Holt State Bank, the Supreme Court held that a lack of language
specifically reserving disputed land was insufficient to overcome the
equal footing doctrine.7 9 Some fifty-five years later, Montana
effectively integrated prior precedent and held the United States did
not reserve title to a riverbed absent both specific langage and a
showing that the Crow Tribe was dependent on fishing.80 Following
Montana, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Alaska, in
which the Court inferred congressional intent to ratify an executive
reservation by looking to language in the Alaska Statehood Act.8 1
Several years later, in 2001, the United States v. Idaho Court looked
to extrinsic evidence of intent to find a reservation of a lakebed for
82
In deciding Milner, the Ninth
the Coeur d'Alene, a fishing tribe.
Circuit relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision and
reasoning in Idaho.83
Where the objective to reserve submerged lands has not been
made clear, intent will not be found.84 In Holt State Bank, the United
States sought to quiet title to a dried lakebed that was once part of the
Red Lake Indian Reservation, occupied by the Chippewa Tribe in
Minnesota.
The lake was contained within the reservation at the
time of Minnesota's admission to the Union. 86 The treaties on which
the Court relied used general language laying out only the boundaries
of the reservation. 87 The Court reasoned that, in the absence of any
language within the treaty expressly indicating the United States'
intention to retain rights to the lakebed, title passed to the State of

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
Mont., 450 U.S. at 551-552.
Alaska, 521 U.S. at 1.
Idaho, 533 U.S. at 272-274.
Milner, 583 F.3d at 1183-1184.
Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
Id at 49.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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Minnesota and the Chippewa shared the privilege of common access
to the lake with the public.8 8
In Montana, the Court held that the mere fact that a riverbed
lies within the boundaries defined by a treaty does not overcome the
presumption against its conveyance to a state upon admission to the
Union, especially when that would not defeat the purpose of the
reservation. 89 The Crow Tribe asserted a claim to bed of the Big
Horn River under both the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 185190 and
the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868.91 The latter defined the
boundaries of the Crow Reservation for the "absolute" use by the
Crow people. 92 Though the portion of the Big Horn River at issue
fell within the reservation's bounds, the Supreme Court found the
"treaty in no way expressly referred to the riverbed."9 3 The Court
noted that under the equal footing doctrine, the general rule is that
title to the land underlying all navigable waters passes to a newly
admitted state upon admission to the Union. 94 In holding that title to
the Big Horn riverbed passed to Montana at statehood, the Court
found no "public exigency" existed that would justify a reservation of
the riverbed because "the Crows were a nomadic tribe dependent
88. Id. at 58-59.
89. Mont., 450 U.S. at 544.
90.
The Crow did not agree to the final terms of this treaty and were not
signatories to the amended treaty in 1851. Kappler, supra n. 19 at 594; (see also 11
Stat. 743).
91.
Treaty between the United States of America and the Crow Tribe of
Indians; concluded May 7, 1868; Ratification advised July 25, 1868; Proclaimed
August 12, 1868. 15 Stat. 649 (1869) [hereinafter Second Treaty ofFortLaramie].
92. Id. at 650.
93.
Mont., 450 U.S. at 554. The Court then distinguished the broad
language establishing the boundaries of the Crow Reservation in Montana from the
treaty in Choctaw Nation v. Okla., where the federal government pledged that "no
Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the
Choctaw Nation . . . and that no part of the land granted to them shall ever be

embraced in any Territory or State." Mont., 450 U.S. at 555 n. 5. (discussing
Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 397 U.S. 620, 635 (1970)).
94. Id. at 551. The equal footing doctrine established that all lands held
by the United States in a territorial period, passed to the state at statehood. Pollard,
44 U.S. at 222-223. Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court held that the
United States could withhold land for an "international duty or public exigency."
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 50 (1894). Navigable waters are those bodies of
water that are navigable in fact, meaning they are capable of being used for
commerce. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871).
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chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was not important to their diet or way
of life." 9 5
Alaska determined that although Congress may not have
specifically ratified an executive reservation, subsequent broad
language in the Alaska Statehood Act sufficiently indicated
Congress' intent to ratify the executive acts.96 There, the State of
Alaska challenged President Harding's authority to issue the
executive order retaining lands below the high-water mark on the
coast of Alaska. 97 The Court concluded that the President was
authorized under the Pickett Act 98 to set aside land for public
purposes subject to revocation by either the executive or an act of
Congress. 99 Still, Alaska maintained the Pickett Act did not
authorize the President to withhold submerged lands, since such
reservations were neither expressly authorized by the Act nor subject
to general land laws. 00 The Court held that, regardless of whether
the Pickett Act intended for the executive to reserve submerged
lands, the executive order demonstrated the requisite intent to reserve
those lands and placed Congress on notice. 01 Congress recognized
that intent when it admitted Alaska as a state because the Alaska
Statehood Act referenced the lands reserved by the president.' 02
In Idaho, the Supreme Court held Congress clearly intended
to recognize the pre-statehood reservation of a lakebed by the United

95.
Id. at 556. Compare with Stotts, 49 F.2d at 621, finding that as a
matter of common sense, the Lummi subsisted on fishing, for which the tidelands
were a necessary requisite; the President's proclamation recognized the need and
logically extended the Reservation to encompass the low-water mark.
96. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 45.
97. Id. at 43. Compare with Romaine, 255 F. at 260, holding that
President Grant's executive order expanding the Reservation's boundaries could
not be compromised by a surveyor's erroneous exclusion of the islands in
controversy. Notably, this holding rested on the unchallenged presumption that the
president possessed authority to make a lasting pre-statehood reservation.
98. An Act to Authorize the President of the United States to Make
Withdrawals ofPublic Lands in Certain Cases, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1911).
99. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 43.
100. Id. at 44.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 11(b), 72 Stat. 339 (1959).
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States for the benefit of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 103 In Idaho, the
United States brought suit against the state of Idaho seeking to quiet
title to submerged lands within the Coeur d'Alene Indian
Reservation.10 4 The Idaho Court acknowledged that when deciding a
question involving title to the bed of navigable waterways, the
presumption favors retention by a state. 05 The Court applied a twopart test to rebut the equal footing doctrine, asking whether Congress
intended the land to be included in the reservation, and if so, whether
it intended title to remain with the United States upon statehood. 06
The Court expressly stated that "congressional intent is satisfied
when an executive reservation clearly includes submerged lands and
Congress recognizes the reservation in a way that demonstrates intent
to defeat state title."' 07
Whether Congress adequately recognized the reservation
likewise appeared to be subject to a two-part analysis. First, the
Idaho Court considered whether Congress was put on notice that the
executive reservation included submerged lands. 08 Secondly, it
examined whether the purpose of the reservation would have been
compromised had title been allowed to pass to the state. 109 Where
the purpose of the reservation would have been undermined, the
Court concluded, "it is not simply plausible that the United States
sought to reserve only the upland portions of the area.""l0
In Idaho, an 1873 Executive Order by President Grant defined
the bounds of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. However, the order
failed to address whether the reservation included submerged
lands.'
Idaho acknowledged that by the time it was admitted as a
state, Congress had reasonably interpreted that the executive branch
intended to include the submerged lands, based on the Coeur
d'Alene's dependence on fishing and need for access to the lake.l12
103. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 280-281.
104. Id. at 265.
105. Id at 273 (citing Alaska, 521 U.S. at 31).
106. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 273 (The Idaho Court adopted this test from Utah
Div. ofSt. Lands v. US., 482 U.S. 193, 202 (1987)).
107. Id
108. Id. at 274.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Kappler, supra n. 19, at 837.
112. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274.
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Instead of relying on the executive order to demonstrate the intent to
reserve the submerged lands, the Idaho Court looked to two
negotiations with the tribe." 3 In 1887, the tribe ceded part of the
reservation in exchange for the assurance that "no part of said
reservation shall ever be sold, occupied, open to white settlement or
otherwise disposed of without the consent of the Indians residing on
said reservation."ll 4 The tribe disposed of the northern portion of the
reservation in 1889, at which time the government agent handling the
transaction stated "you still have the St. Joseph River and the lower
part of the lake."i1s After the Senate, but before the House, had
ratified the agreements, Idaho was admitted to the Union on July 3,
1890 "on an equal footing with the original States."1 6 In Idaho, the
Court found Congress intended to reserve title to submerged lands,
where neither the executive order nor the agreements between the
Coeur d'Alene and the United States had specifically articulated their
inclusion.i"7 The Court found that the negotiating history of the 1887
and 1889 agreements made Congress well aware that when it
admitted Idaho as a state, admission was subject to the full extent of
the executive order reserving the submerged lands." 8
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court
''must not infer such a conveyance unless the intention was definitely
declared or otherwise made very plain, or was rendered in clear and
especial words, or unless the claim confirmed in terms embraces the
land under the waters . . . ." 119

The dissent also criticized the

majority for considering events after Idaho's admission-the
ratification of the 1887 and 1889 agreements-to determine the
United States intended to reserve title.120
Over time, overcoming the presumption of equal footing has
largely required specific language of a reservation. However, as

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

Id. at 266-267.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 280-281.
Idaho, 533 U.S. at 280-281.
Id. at 282 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
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indicated in Montana and illustrated in both Alaska and Idaho, the
Court has been willing to stretch its analysis in the case of a public
exigency or a clearly intended reservation.
Of course, such
exceptions have not come without strong dissenters, such as that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Idaho as noted above.
B. Justice in Interpretation
In interpreting treaties with Indians tribes, the United States
Supreme Court has long maintained that treaties must be interpreted
as the Indians would have understood them,121 and any ambiguities
should be resolved in the Indians' favor. 122 In Jones v. Meehan, the
Supreme Court was charged with determining the nature of a grant of
land to a member of the Chippewa Tribe who consequently entered
into lease agreements with non-Indian lessors. 123 Justice Gray,
writing for the majority, surmised that consideration should be given
to the circumstances under which the Indians were compelled to
agree.124 Treaties between the United States and Indian tribes were
made on an unequal footing; while the United States was armed with
skilled negotiators and were "masters of written language,"1 25 the
tribes were considered "wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal
expression, and . . . the terms in which the treaty is framed is that

imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United States . .
19126
For that reason, the Court held that the treaty must be
construed in a manner favorable to the Indians despite the language
within.127
From the foregoing precedent, it is apparent that to overcome
the presumption granted under the equal footing doctrine, a court
must apply a two-part analysis to recognize reservations held in title
by the United States to submerged lands on Indian reservations.
First, a court must consider congressional intent that the submerged

121.
122.

Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 551 (1832).
Choctaw Nation v. Okla., 397 U.S. at 631 (citing Jones, 175 U.S. at

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Jones, 175 U.S. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.

11).
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lands were to be part of the Indian reservation, and second, a court
must ask whether Congress recognized that intention. If both prongs
are met, then the United States defeats the presumption that title to
those lands passed to a state upon admission to the Union.128 The
second prong of the test considers two additional factors: (1) whether
Congress took notice of the executive branch's reservation' 29 by
ratifying a treaty; and (2) whether, in the absence of the reserved
lands, the purpose of the reservation would be undermined in
conjunction with a tribe's traditional way of life and needs.13 0
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit decided the issue of title to the tidelands in
Milner correctly. As a preliminary matter, the Pacific Ocean is
undisputedly navigable-in-fact. Further, the Supreme Court has held
that the equal footing doctrine applies to tidelands subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.' 3 ' The Milner court first stated that the issue of
title had previously been settled, and as a matter of stare decisis,
should be laid to rest.132 Even so, the court undertook an analysis to
rebut the presumption under the equal footing doctrine. The court
analyzed the United States' intent to reserve the tidelands and
whether Congress recognized that intent. While the homeowners
argued that the lack of ratification of President Grant's 1873
Executive Order prohibited title from remaining with the United
States, controlling law provides a more compelling application in this
case for an effective reservation of the tidelands by the United States
because a public exigency existed. The facts presented in Milner
fulfilled the two-prong test because Congress gave the executive the
power to make reservations and recognized that reservation when
Washington was admitted as a state.

.128. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 273.
129. Id. at 274.
130. Compare id. with Mont., 450 U.S. at 556.
131. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
132. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1184-1185 (citing U.S. v. Wash., 969 F.2d 752,
755-756 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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A. Intention to Reserve the Tidelands
Congress has the ability to reserve, or grant the power to
reserve, territorial lands for a public purpose. Congress' authority to
act regarding public land under the property clause is "without
limitations." 3 3 By recognizing the Treaty of Point Elliot, Congress
delegated its Article IV powers to regulate lands subject to the treaty
to the executive branch. Since Pollard v. Hagan,134 the Supreme
Court has recognized the federal government's right to make prestatehood reservations or conveyances of land; however, the
presumption is in favor of the state.1 35
The President was authorized to alter the bounds of the
Lummi Reservation. 136 President Grant, acting within the power
delegated to him by Congress in Article VII of the Treaty of Point
Elliot, issued his 1873 Executive Order, and in plain and
unambiguous language expanded the bounds of the Lummi
Reservation to the low-water mark of the Gulf of Georgia.' 3 7 In
giving the President this power, it was certainly foreseeable that he
would exercise his ability to expand, relocate or contract the bounds
of the Reservation. When President Grant included the tideland in
the Reservation, Article II of the Treaty of Point Elliot, prohibiting
non-tribal occupation of the Reservation lands without permission,
applied to the newly annexed tidelands, no longer making them
subject to common use under Article V.1 38
The United States intended to reserve the tidelands because
President Grant's executive order clearly included them in the
Lummi Reservation. 139 The express language defining the bounds of
the reservation was notably absent in both Holt State Bank and
Montana; both cases ultimately found that title rested with the
states.140 Likewise, in Idaho, neither the executive order nor the
relevant treaties contained language specifically addressing

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

U.S. v. S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
Pollardv. Hagan,44 U.S. 212 (1845).
Utah, 482 U.S. at 198; see also Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
Treaty ofPoint Elliot, supra n. 12, at 929.
Kappler, supra n. 19, at 917.
Treaty ofPoint Elliot, supra n. 12, at 928-929.
Kappler, supra n. 19, at 917; 26 Stat. 1552, 1553.
See generally Mont., 450 U.S. 544; Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. 49.
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submerged lands; yet, their inclusion had to be interpreted to satisfy
the purpose of the reservation.141 However, in Milner the intention to
reserve the tidelands for the Lummi was made clear through express
language in President Grant's Executive Order, as required by the
Supreme Court since Holt State Bank. Because the President
appropriated the tidelands, specifically to the low-tide line,142 this
case indeed presents a stronger set of facts for intent to reserve than
Idaho, where the language did not specifically call for the retention
of submerged land on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.143
Furthermore, the plain and explicit description of the land to be
reserved meets the higher burden proposed by the dissenting Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Idaho.144
B. Congress Recognized the Intent to Reserve the Tidelands
Congressional intent was fulfilled because Congress
recognized the effect of the Executive Order when Washington was
admitted as a state in 1889. Milner is similar to Alaska, where
Congress likewise entrusted the President with the power to reserve
submerged lands.14 5 Because the tidelands were part of the
Reservation in 1889 due to the Executive Order, they were expressly
included in the Enabling Act of 1889 under Section IV in a
subsection labeled: "Renunciation of public lands." 46
When
Congress ratified Washington's statehood, a condition of which was
the reservations under Section IV, it follows that the borders of the
Lummi Reservation included all adjustments which Congress had

141. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274.
142. Kappler, supra n. 19, at 917.
143. Idaho, 533 U.S. 266-267. While the homeowner's argument - that
Romaine involves a similar set of facts - is not misplaced, the Milner court used the
case to illustrate the historic treatment of the executive order and to set the stage for
an application of more recent authority. See supran. 91.
144. Id. at 292. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, and with the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist, all
remain on the Court as of the publication of this comment.
145. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 43.
146. 25 Stat. at 677.
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authorized the President to make, as alluded to in Alaska.147 Had
Congress not wanted the President to exercise his authority, it simply
could have withheld the enumeration of his power to do so from the
Treaty of Point Elliot. For this reason, congressional ratification of
Washington's statehood included the Lummi tidelands reserved by
President Grant in 1873.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated in Idaho that an
underlying consideration as to congressional intent to defeat the
presumption of state title is whether doing so would undermine the
purpose of the reservation.148 The question, however, is not whether
the impact of transferring title would frustrate the purpose of the
reservation of the tidelands today, but rather at the time of
Washington's admission as a state. The culture of the Coeur d'Alene
in Idaho traditionally centered on fishing.14 9 The classification of a
tribe's dependency on fishing in Idaho as a public purpose for
reservation was derived from Montana.50
The Lummi's dependence upon fishing creates a strong
inference in their favor. In Montana, the Court specifically held the
federal government could reserve lands in the case of a public
exigency.1s Since the Crow did not depend on fishing for either
their sustenance or way of life at the time of the treaty, the Court
determined that they did not meet the criteria for such an
exception.152 In Milner, if title had passed to Washington at
statehood, it would have taken away the Lummi's unencumbered
right to use the tidelands. Unlike the Crow, the Lummi have long
been dependent on fishing and therefore fit the category of public
exigency at-as well as prior to-Washington's admission to the
Union.
The exclusive-use provision in the Treaty of Point Elliot
strengthens the presumption in favor of the Indians. 1 54 In Montana,

147. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 45.
148. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274.
149. Stark, supra n. 5, at 12.
150. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274. Montana, likewise derived the concept of a
public exigency from Shivley.
151. Mont., 450 U.S. at 556 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 48).
152. Id.
153. Supra n.6.
154. Treaty ofPoint Elliot, supra n. 12, at 928.
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there was also an exclusive-use provision, but that seemed to
disintegrate, due in part to the lack of a public exigency.'
On the
other hand, an exclusive-use provision in Idaho appeared to be
greatly buttressed by both subsequent dealings with the Lummi and,
most especially, the Lummi's reliance on fishing. 156 For this reason,
we can conclude that dependence on fishing is a public exigency and
a valid purpose for a reservation.15 7
Considering exclusive-use provisions, the finding of a public
exigency appears to be more determinative of the outcome than does
the plain language of the contested reservations. For example, the
language in the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, implicated in
Montana, stated that the Crow would have the "absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation" of their reservation, which
encompassed portions of the Big Horn River.158 Similarly, the
lakebed in Holt State Bank fell within the defined bounds of the Red
Lake Indian Reservation but was not specifically mentioned in the
reservation. 159 Conversely, in Idaho, where the executive order did
not expressly define the contested reservation, the Court reached for
extrinsic evidence of intent to find a reservation of a portion of Lake
Coeur d'Alene.160 The difference was that in Montana and Holt State
Bank, neither the Crow nor the Chippewa, respectively, were fishing
tribes, while the Coeur d'Alene, in Idaho, were dependent upon
fishing.161 Drawing upon historic application, the Lummi's reliance
upon fishing in and of itself would seem to seal the fate of any party
contesting the intent to reserve the tidelands.
Because the finding of a public exigency carries such great
weight, it is surprising that it has not been expanded beyond fishing
to include other uses of the beds of navigable waters. The Crow, for
example, believed water possessed great medicinal values, enabling

155. Mont., 450 U.S. at 555-556.
156. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 269; Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties
vol. 1, 837 (2d ed., Govt. Printing Off.)
157. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274.
158. Second Treaty ofFortLaramie, supra n. 9 1, at 50.
159. Holt St. Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
160. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 266-267.
161. Id. at 274.
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them to "live and enjoy life." 1 6 2 Each day, the Crow were summoned
to drink all the water they could, believing "water is your body."l 63
Surely there is an argument to be considered for the Crow's
philosophical regard for water. Furthermore, the Crow were
dependent upon maintaining large herds of horses for social status
and mobility in both warfare and hunting. 164 Horses require a great
deal of water, and water provides a natural boundary to aid in
controlling a herd in the otherwise sparse and semi-arid climate
surrounding the Big Horn River. The Crow continued to utilize
horses even after the establishment of the Crow Reservation.165
Undoubtedly, the threshold of what constitutes a public exigency is
murky. Why observations such as these were not deemed viable
arguments in Montana may never be known. Such arguments may
arise in future disputes concerning the equal footing doctrine.
It is also notable in this case that the Lummi were seeking a
lesser quantity of property than the Crow, or any of the other
claimants discussed. The Lummi sought only the riparian area
between the high and low water marks. This evades a prior concern
noted by the Supreme Court that the waters remain free for
commerce.1 66 The Crow and Coeur d'Alene sought title to the literal
bed of the respective waterways in their litigation, while the Lummi
only claimed a portion of an ambulatory shoreline. Even though the
disputed land may seem an insignificant patch of terrain, resources
and property rights at stake for the prevailing party.167
Looking to the Treaty of Point Elliot, specifically Article V,
the drafters clearly understood that the Lummi and other coastal
tribes who were privy to the Treaty of Point Elliot depended on the

162. Robert H. Lowie, The Crow Indians 89 (J.J. Little and Ives Co. 1935).
163. Id. (emphasis in original).
164. John Wade Stafford, Crow Culture Change: A GeographicalAnalysis
46-48 (U. Microfilms 1980).
165. Id. at 48.
166. U.S. v. Or., 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
167. E.g. Okla. v. Tex., 258 U.S. 574 (1922) (states both claimed title to
portions of the bed of the Red River where parties had staked placer mining claims
and oil and gas proceeds were at stake); PPL Mont., LLC v. Mont., 2010 MT 64,
355 Mont. 402, 229 P.3d 421(petitionfor cert.filed, Aug. 8, 2010), (finding State
owned three riverbeds and was entitled to damages for the electric generator's use
those riverbeds at hydroelectric power sites).
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shores of the Pacific Ocean for their own survival.168 Because this
apparent dependence existed and Congress granted the president the
authority to make such a reservation, Congress clearly intended to
include the tidelands in the Lummi Reservation when Washington
was admitted to the Union.
C. The Lummi Understoodthe Tidelands to be
Reservedfor Their Exclusive Use
Any uncertainties as to the reservation of the tidelands should
have been resolved in favor of the Lummi. Because the Supreme
Court has adhered to a policy of interpreting treaties and agreements
with the Indians as the Indians would have understood them, and
evidence clearly demonstrates the Lummi believed that they were the
sole beneficiaries of the tidelands, title appropriately came to rest
with the United States in trust for the Lummi.1 69
The Lummi understood the tidelands to be reserved for them
by the United States. By 1889 the Lummi certainly believed they
were the beneficiaries of the tidelands held in trust by the United
States in accordance with President Grant's 1873 Order. Evidence of
this is noted by the fact that the Lummi did not attempt to shift title to
the tidelands along with the uplands that were subject to the
Allotment Act of 1887. Furthermore, over the past century, the
Lummi entered into leasing agreements of the tidelands, even with
the defendant homeowners. To be a lessor, one must have a property
interest in the leased property.170 The Lummi's leasing of the
tidelands demonstrated, in an open and obvious manner, a good faith
belief that they held a property interest in those lands, and the
continued longevity of those leases further supports this good faith
belief.
In the absence of express language, a public exigency may
compel a court to give greater deference to a tribe's understanding of

168. Treaty ofPoint Elliot, supra n. 12, at 928.
169. Jones, 175 U.S. at 11.
170. Restatement (Second) of Property §1.2 (1977). U.S. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., described property rights as the rights "to possess, use and dispose" of
physical things. 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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a treaty or contract.17 1 Although the presumption as stated in Jones
was not specifically referred to in Idaho, the Court's discussion took
into account the Coeur d'Alene's actions after the bounds of the
reservation were described to them in general terms, evidencing their
belief that they were the beneficiaries of the lakebed.17 2 The dissent
in Idaho took odds with the fact that despite a lack of an express
articulation of an intention to reserve the submerged lands; the Court
still found in favor of the tribe. 173
In the case of the Lummi, the executive branch of the federal
government expressly reserved tidelands for the tribe, which at that
time was chiefly dependent on fishing. Similar to Idaho, the Lummi
have since acted in a way that demonstrates a good faith belief of a
property interest in the tidelands. Because the Lummi believed that
the express reservation by the executive set aside the tidelands
thereafter for their exclusive benefit, the reservation should be
interpreted as surviving Washington's territorial period.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Milner is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent regarding both federal reservations under
the equal footing doctrine and interpretation of treaties with Indian
tribes. In Alaska, the Supreme Court left the door open as to whether
an executive order that had not been overtly ratified was alone
sufficient to make a lasting reservation of property for the federal
government.174 The equal footing doctrine is often very contentious
due to the natural resources and property rights at stake and will
presumably remain that way as new methods emerge to develop the
nation's previously untapped reserves. Resolving these issues often
depends on extrinsic evidence of intent surrounding treaties executed
in the nineteenth century. Although the circumstances under which
the treaties were executed have been obscured by time, a look to the
original public exigency or general purpose of the reservation is often
as accurate as courts can reasonably be without embarking on an

171. E.g. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274.
172. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 267, 270.
173. Id. at 282 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 44.
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impossible quest for the precise facts. Reserving land beneath
navigable waters for a tribe dependent upon fishing, as in Milner,
appears from both Idaho and Montana to be a public exigency, a
valid purpose for the reservation. Had the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, it is likely that the bounds surrounding the somewhatobscure rule pertaining to federal reservations of submerged lands
would have become more clearly defined. However, given the
current authority on the subject, along with the policy that treaties
with Indians be interpreted as they understood them, Milner was
correctly decided.
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

175. Stark, supra n. 4, at 15. The Gulf of Georgia is located in top lefthand corner of the map. The tidelands at issue are located on Sandy Point, the
small peninsula in the same area dividing the Gulf of Georgia fiom Onion Bay.
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176

176. U.S. Dept. of the Int., Master Title Plats -Washington,

http://www.blm.gov/or/landrecords/wa/38OnOlOemOl.jpg (Apr. 3, 2010). The bold
line commencing at the mouth of the Lummi River, marked with a star, represents
the northern portion of President Grant's reservation under the executive order.
The reservation continued along the low-water mark around the rest of the
peninsula until meeting up again at the mouth of the Lummi River.

